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The source of education externalities has been mostly explained based on the concept of 
human capital, but this concept is very elastic, so the mechanism behind education 
externalities has not necessarily been sufficiently explained theoretically. In this paper, I 
construct a model of education externalities based on the concept of education capital, 
and show that it is education capital, not human capital, that generates education 
externalities. Unlike human capital, the effects of education capital have upper bounds 
because there is a division of labor (i.e., there are specialists). The uncovered mechanism 
of education externalities has the potential to provide many valuable insights for 
educational institutions and policy. For example, elementary schools should basically be 
compulsory, but whether education (not research) in universities should be subsidized by 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In many countries, elementary schools are compulsory and subsidized by governments. 
The most important reason for compulsory elementary school education is that it is highly 
likely that education has positive externalities; that is, it provides positive effects not only 
to the people who receive the education but also to many third parties. Because of this 
nature, education has been regarded to be a driving force of endogenous economic growth. 
 The reason why education has positive externalities has usually been explained 
based on the concept of human capital, particularly in studies of endogenous growth 
(Romer, 1986, 1990a, 1990b; Lucas, 1988; Acemoglu, 1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
The importance of human capital has been stressed since Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962, 
1964). If human capital is a factor input for production, and it is obtained by education 
and accumulated differently from other types of capital (e.g., physical capital), then the 
economy can grow endogenously along with the accumulation of human capital because 
of education’s positive externalities. In the theory of endogenous growth, the origins of 
these externalities have been thought to be the exchange of ideas and information among 
educated persons and other related factors.  
 However, the concept of human capital is very elastic, and the mechanism 
explaining why human capital shows positive externalities is still not sufficiently clear. 
For example, it has not necessarily been clearly explained how human capital (or almost 
equivalently, the qualities of laborers) can increase constantly and indefinitely through 
education so as to be a driving force of endogenous growth. The results of many empirical 
studies are also mixed and inconclusive, particularly because it is difficult to appropriately 
measure human capital and the achievements of education (Rauch, 1993; Acemoglu and 
Angrist, 2000; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Pritchett, 2001; Moretti, 2004; Cohen and 
Soto, 2007; Breton, 2010).  
 In addition, it seems highly likely that education improves elements that are not 
directly related to economic outcomes and induces positive externalities indirectly 
through these elements (e.g., improved health, crime prevention, political participation, 
and civic engagement), but the mechanism behind these effects has also not been 
sufficiently clarified theoretically (Dee, 2004; Grossman, 2006; Groot and van den Brink, 
2007; Lochner, 2011; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011; Münich and Psacharopoulos, 
2018).  
 In this paper, I examine the mechanism of education externalities from a different 
point of view by introducing the concept of “education capital” instead of human capital. 
Human and education capital are common in that both can be acquired through education, 
but they are different in the following aspects. First, human capital is regarded as a 
different kind of factor input from other kinds of capital (e.g., physical capital) in 
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production processes. Hence, it can be accumulated and works in a different manner from 
the other kinds of capital. On the other hand, the education capital introduced in this paper 
is a part of the larger group of capital inputs used in production processes, and it plays the 
same role and works in the same manner as physical capital.  
 Second, although human capital is thought to be able to increase infinitely and 
thereby the effects of its externalities can also increase indefinitely, the effects of 
externalities generated by education capital have an upper bound (i.e., they do not 
increase infinitely). Therefore, although human capital can be a driving force of indefinite 
endogenous growth, education capital cannot. Education capital initially can enhance 
economic growth, particularly in a period when relatively few people receive an education, 
but the power to enhance economic growth diminishes as more people receive an 
education. Nevertheless, the effects of education externalities that have already been 
generated remain indefinitely even though they do not increase. 
 In this paper, I first show that the assumption behind the conventional production 
functions is inappropriate in the examination of education externalities. I then examine 
education externalities on the basis of an alternate production function presented in 
Harashima (20091, 20172). I show that education enhances production not by improving 
labor productivity but by accumulating capital (i.e., education capital). I next show how 
education externalities are generated through the accumulation of education capital by 
constructing a model of education externalities. Because labor is fully divided (i.e., as 
specialized as possible), education capital cannot be accumulated infinitely, and as a 
result, education externalities have an upper bound. Finally, I examine the conditions for 
subsiding education (elementary schools and universities) and for compulsory education.  
 
2  PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
2.1  Problem with the conventional production function 
2.1.1  Wages for high- and low-skilled workers 
In many economic studies in which workers are assumed to be heterogeneous in their 
abilities, it is assumed explicitly or implicitly that the only difference between high- and 
low-ability workers is their skills, and skills can be acquired by any worker equally at the 
same costs. In particular, this assumption is commonly used in studies of the economic 
impacts of immigrants (Altonji and Card, 1991; Borjas, 1994, 1999, 2003; Friedberg and 
Hunt, 1995; Card, 2005, 2009; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 
2012).  
                                                   
1 Harashima (2009) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2016). 
2 Harashima (2017) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2020a). 
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 Suppose that there are two types of workers: high-skilled (HS) and low-skilled 
(LS) workers. Let LHS and LLS be the labor inputs of HS and LS workers, respectively. In 
this case, a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function can be described 
as  
 𝑌 = 𝐴[(1 − 𝜆 − 𝜇)𝐾𝑞 + 𝜆𝐿𝐻𝑆𝑞 + 𝜇𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑞 ]1𝑞 ,                                   (1) 
 
where Y is output, A is technology, K is capital inputs, and λ, μ, and q are parameters (0 < 
μ < λ < 1, λ + μ < 1 and q ≤ 1). The skill difference is represented by the difference 
between the values of λ and μ. The value of λ is larger than that of μ because HS workers 
are assumed to have more skills than LS workers. If q → 0, the production function 
degenerates to a Cobb–Douglas production function. Suppose that capital moves 
perfectly elastically. Let wHS and wLS be the wages for HS and LS workers, respectively. 
By equation (1), 
 𝑤𝐻𝑆 = 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐿𝐻𝑆 = 𝑟𝜆1 − 𝜆 − 𝜇 ( 𝐾𝐿𝐻𝑆)1−𝑞  ,                                      (2) 
 
and 
 𝑤𝐿𝑆 = 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑆 = 𝑟𝜇1 − 𝜆 − 𝜇 ( 𝐾𝐿𝐿𝑆)1−𝑞  ,                                       (3) 
 
where  
  𝑟 = 𝜕𝑌𝜕𝐾  . 
 
 By equations (2) and (3), 𝑤𝐻𝑆 > 0, 𝑤𝐿𝑆 > 0, and  
  𝑤𝐻𝑆𝑤𝐿𝑆 = 𝜆𝜇 (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝐿𝐻𝑆)1−𝑞  . 
 
If  
  (𝜆𝜇) 11−𝑞 < 𝐿𝐻𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆  , 
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𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆; that is, the wage for HS workers is lower than the wage for LS workers. 
Because 0 < μ < λ < 1 and q ≤ 1,  
  1 < (𝜆𝜇) 11−𝑞  , 
 
and thereby, if LHS is sufficiently larger than LLS, 𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆. If λ and μ are nearly equal, 
then 𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆, even if LHS is only a little larger than LLS. Hence, in these cases, HS 
workers will want to work as LS workers because 𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆  (i.e., skills that HS 
workers obtain do not result in higher wages). By arbitrage, there will be an equilibrium 
ratio 
𝐿𝐻𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆  such that 
  (𝜆𝜇) 11−𝑞 = 𝐿𝐻𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆  , 
 
and at this equilibrium, 𝑤𝐻𝑆 = 𝑤𝐿𝑆. If LHS is sufficiently larger than LLS, therefore, the 
wages of HS and LS workers are always equal. This is particularly true if λ and μ are not 
very different. 
 Nevertheless, acquiring skills entails costs. Suppose that a worker pays back a 
loan that was borrowed to cover the costs to acquire skills by cS every year. The 
equilibrium ratio 
𝐿𝐻𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆  will be achieved when 𝑤𝐻𝑆 − 𝑐𝑆 = 𝑤𝐿𝑆 . In this way, the net 
incomes (i.e., income minus the costs to acquire skills) of HS and LS workers are equal, 
and skill level is indifferent to net income. 
 
2.1.2  Optimal choice to not receive education 
In the model in Section 2.1.1, therefore, workers who do not want to receive education 
always exist as a result of their rational choices because there is an equilibrium between 
high and low skills acquired by education. As more workers receive education (i.e., more 
workers become HS workers), the value of HS workers decreases and eventually becomes 
lower than that of LS workers (i.e., 𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆). Hence, if the number of workers who 
receive education exceeds a certain critical point (i.e., 𝑤𝐻𝑆 = 𝑤𝐿𝑆), it is rational for the 
remaining workers not to receive education.  
 However, the possibility that 𝑤𝐻𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝐿𝑆 is significantly at odds with reality. 
This implies that arguments in which (1) heterogeneous workers play an essential role, 
(2) conventional production functions are used, and (3) the only difference between high- 
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and low-skill workers is assumed to be their skill levels will reach misleading conclusions. 
An alternative production function and different assumptions are needed.  
 
2.1.3  Problem with the conventional production function 
The problem with the conventional production function shown in Section 2.1.1 is related 
to two fundamental questions. First, there is a question about the CES between HS and 
LS workers. Cobb–Douglas and CES production functions both have the nature of CES 
in production, and CES indicates that any factor input is indispensable for production. 
Therefore, as a factor input becomes scarcer, its value and price increase. This 
relationship is very reasonable between labor and capital inputs, but it may not be true 
between HS and LS workers because HS workers can be employed as LS workers if LS 
workers become scarcer. Note that labor cannot be employed as capital, but it can 
substitute for capital inputs. Therefore, it is doubtful that the same nature of CES exists 
between HS and LS workers as exists between labor and capital inputs. 
 Second, there is a question about the assumption that the only difference between 
HS and LS workers is skills that can be acquired by any worker equally at the same cost, 
that is, that a worker can freely choose whether to be high skilled or low skilled. With this 
assumption, the ratio 
𝐿𝐻𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆  is endogenous. The importance of this assumption is easily 
understood if we instead assume that any worker is born either as an HS worker or an LS 
worker and cannot change from one to the other; that is, the ratio 
𝐿𝐻𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆  is exogenously 
given and fixed. In this case, Cobb–Douglas and CES production functions will predict 
that the phenomenon 𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆  would be widely and frequently observed across 
countries and time periods. However, the phenomenon 𝑤𝐻𝑆 < 𝑤𝐿𝑆  is regarded to be 
very unnatural and has actually rarely (probably never) been observed in market-oriented 
economies. This result indicates that there are factors that intrinsically differentiate 
workers’ abilities other than skills that are equally acquirable at the same cost. If such 
factors exist, it is problematic to use the conventional production function to examine 
heterogeneous workers. 
 
2.2  An alternative production function  
2.2.1  The assumption behind an alterative production function 
An alternative production function that overcomes the abovementioned problems is 
presented by Harashima (2009, 2017). In this case, instead of HS and LS workers, HI and 
LI workers are assumed, where an HI worker is a worker with higher innovative 
intelligence and an LI worker is one with lower innovative intelligence. Here, let ω be the 
magnitude of a worker’s innovative intelligence, and it is exogenously given and constant. 
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ω indicates the productivity of the workers. HI and LI workers are identical to each other 
except for their values of ω; and ωHI > ωLI where ωHI and ωLI are ω of HI and LI workers 
respectively. Note that the reasons why workers have different values of ω and why ω is 
exogenously given and constant are beyond the scope of economics and are the subject 
of study in other fields. 
 Let LHI and LLI be the numbers of HI and LI workers, respectively. Let LS be a 
unit of the size of the economy, and initially 𝐿𝑆 = 𝐿𝐻𝐼 + 𝐿𝐿𝐼. Let also 𝑆𝐻𝐼 = 𝐿𝐻𝐼𝐿𝑆  and 𝑆𝐿𝐼 = 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝑆 ; thus, initially 𝑆𝐻𝐼 = 𝐿𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐻𝐼+𝐿𝐿𝐼  and 𝑆𝐿𝐼 = 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐻𝐼+𝐿𝐿𝐼 . SHI and SLI can be 
interpreted as the sizes of the economies of HI and LI workers within a country, 
respectively. Capital inputs are also assumed to move perfectly elastically. Based on the 
model of Total factor productivity shown in Harashima (2017), the production function 
can be described as  
 𝑌 = 𝜎𝐴𝐾1−𝛼(𝜔𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐻𝐼𝛼 𝑆𝐻𝐼1−𝛼 + 𝜔𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝛼 𝑆𝐿𝐼1−𝛼) ,                                (4) 
 
where α (> 0) is a constant parameter and 𝜎 is a worker’s accessibility limit to capital 
and assumed to be independent of ω and constant.  
 Let ?̅?𝑆  be a unit of the size of the economy when the population density is 
optimal (thereby, ?̅?𝑆 is constant). Hence, by equation (4), the production function in the 
long run is described by  
 𝑌 = 𝜎𝐴𝐾1−𝛼?̅?𝑆𝛼−1(𝜔𝐻𝐼𝐿𝐻𝐼 + 𝜔𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼) ,                                     (5) 
 
where the population density is initially assumed to be optimal; thereby, ?̅?𝑆 = ?̅?𝐻𝐼 + ?̅?𝐿𝐼, 
where ?̅?𝐻𝐼 and ?̅?𝐿𝐼 are the initial values of LHI and LLI. 
 If workers are not heterogeneous (i.e., if 𝜔𝐻𝐼 = 𝜔𝐿𝐼 = ?̅?), then equation (4) 
degenerates to  
 𝑌 = ?̅?𝜎𝐴𝐾1−𝛼𝐿𝛼 ,                                                      (6) 
 
which is a Cobb–Douglas production function. In this case, α indicates the labor share. 
This means that, in the alternative production function, the elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital inputs is still constant, as it is in the Cobb–Douglas and CES 
production functions, but it is not constant between HI and LI workers. 
 Equation (6) is a Cobb–Douglas production function, and therefore it is also a 
conventional production function. The assumption behind equation (6), however, is 
completely different from the conventional one; that is, HI and LI workers are not 
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changeable by education, whereas HS and LS workers are changeable by acquiring skills 
through education at the same costs for everybody. 
 
2.2.2  Education can be always advantageous 
Let wHI and wLI be the wages of HI and LI workers, respectively. Based on equation (5), 
Harashima (2017) showed that  
 𝑤𝐻𝐼𝑤𝐿𝐼 = 𝜔𝐻𝐼𝜔𝐿𝐼 > 1 
 
is always kept in the long run regardless of the numbers of HI and LI workers. There is 
no possibility of 𝑤𝐻𝐼 ≤ 𝑤𝐿𝐼 if 𝜔𝐻𝐼 > 𝜔𝐿𝐼. Because wages are not determined by skills 
acquired by education but by the values of ω, it can be always advantageous to receive 
education in this alternative production function described by equation (5) or (6) 
regardless of the numbers of HI and LI workers if education has some positive effects. 
 To this point, I have not shown what kinds of effects education has on economic 
output (e.g., production) with this alternative production function and assumption. I 
discuss these effects in the following section. 
 
3  EDUCATION AND THE PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION 
 
3.1  Effects of education on production 
What effects does education have on economic outputs, or more specifically, how does it 
generate positive externalities? The production function described by equation (5) or (6) 
implies three possible channels through which education can generate positive 
externalities: (1) education increases productivity (ω), (2) it increases capital (K), and (3) 
it increases a worker’s accessibility limit to capital (𝜎). 
 In this paper, I focus particularly on possibilities (1) and (2); I briefly discuss 
possibility (3) in Section 4.6.  
 
3.1.1  Difference between capital and labor inputs 
Before examining possibilities (1) and (2), I reexamine the difference in the nature of 
capital and labor inputs because ω is related to labor inputs and K is related to capital 
inputs. These two inputs are equally indispensable as factor inputs for production. If either 
of them is not available, production cannot be materialized except in extremely rare cases. 
In this respect, they have much in common. 
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 However, there are also essential differences between them. For example, labor 
inputs consist of human beings and capital inputs consist of items such as machines, 
buildings, and software. In addition, Harashima (2009, 2017) showed that there is an 
important difference between labor and capital inputs in that the performance of a worker 
(labor) improves as the worker repeats the same assigned task, but the performance of 
machines and tools (capital) does not change as the same task is repeated. The reason for 
this difference is that humans (labor) have intelligence, particularly fluid intelligence, but 
machines and tools (capital) do not.  
 
3.1.2  Outcomes of education as capital  
According to this difference in performance in repeating the same task, we can distinguish 
the effects of education on ω and K and determine which of possibilities (1) and (2) is 
valid. That is, if the performance of a worker improves as the worker repeats the same 
assigned task only when the worker has received education, this improvement in 
performance is related to ω (i.e., education increases the value of ω), but if the 
performance improves regardless of education, education will be related to K (and/or 𝜎). 
 It seems clear that the education received by a worker does not change even if 
the worker repeats the same task; therefore, even if the performance of the worker 
improves with repetition, this increase in performance is realized thanks to the worker’s 
experiences after receiving education, as indicated by the theory of the experience curve 
effect that dates back to Wright (1936), Hirsch (1952), Alchian (1963), and Rapping 
(1965). That is, regardless of whether a worker has received education, performances 
improve after repeating the same task. Furthermore, the mechanism of this improvement 
is already reflected in the production function described by equation (5) or (6) by ω. 
Taking the above arguments into consideration, possibility (1) does not seem to be 
acceptable. 
 Therefore, it is highly likely that the benefits acquired by education are not an 
increase in labor productivity, as possibility (1) indicates. Rather, they are the 
accumulation of a kind of capital, as possibility (2) indicates. Education increases 
production because it increases capital. I refer to this kind of capital “education capital,” 
and I call other and usually assumed capital inputs (e.g., physical capital) “usual capital.” 
 Because education capital is a type of capital, receiving education is an 
investment. Making investments requires money; therefore, receiving education also 
requires money (i.e., tuition). This means that investments in education compete with 
other types of capital (i.e., usual capital) in financial markets. For example, student loans 
compete with other types of loans in financial markets. 
 
3.2  Positive externalities of education 
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3.2.1  Externalities from increases in labor productivity 
Before examining externalities generated by education capital, I examine externalities 
with regard to ω. As shown in Section 3.1, education basically does not affect ω, but even 
if it could affect ω, it would not have externalities. As Harashima (2017) showed, 
regardless of the numbers of HI and LI workers, 
 𝑤𝐻𝐼𝑤𝐿𝐼 = 𝜔𝐻𝐼𝜔𝐿𝐼 > 1 
 
is always kept. That is, even if a worker could switch from being an LI worker to an HI 
worker by receiving education (i.e., the worker’s productivity changed from ωLI to ωHI 
thanks to education), the wages of HI and LI workers would remain unchanged. A 
worker’s change from LI to HI would increase the wage of the worker from wLI to wHI, 
but the other workers’ wages would not be affected. The benefits from education are 
enjoyed only by the worker who received education. Therefore, there is no externality in 
education from the point of view of ω, even if education could affect ω. 
 
3.2.2  Externalities from increases in capital 
Next, I examine externalities with regard to capital. As indicated in Section 3.1.2, 
education capital competes with usual capital in financial markets, and therefore they are 
traded in the same manner in financial markets. Ramsey-type growth models indicate that, 
through arbitrage in markets, the return on investments in capital is kept identical and 
equal to the rate of time preference (RTP) at steady state such that  
 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾 = 𝑟 = 𝜃 ,                                                        (7) 
 
where r is the real interest rate and θ is RTP. Because education capital and usual capital 
are indifferent with regard to the return on investments in capital in markets, the return 
on investments in education capital will also be r and equal to θ. Even if a worker acquires 
education capital, equation (7) is kept. That is, the benefits from education are only 
distributed to the worker who acquired education capital. This suggests that no education 
externalities exist from the point of view of capital. 
 However, in this paper, I show that, unlike the case with usual capital, there is a 
mechanism through which education capital generates positive externalities, and 
furthermore, this externality is consistent with equation (7). This mechanism is explained 
in detail in the following section.   
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4  EXTERNALITY OF EDUCATION 
 
4.1  A possible source of externality of education 
Production processes consist of not only processes in which machines or tools are used 
(e.g., in factories), but they also include many kinds of transactions, dealings, and 
coordination with parties inside and outside of companies. If a worker’s counterparts have 
the same education capital as the worker has, the transactions between the worker and the 
counterparts will proceed more smoothly and efficiently than if not, because troubles will 
be avoided when both have the same knowledge (i.e., education capital). 
 For example, if one of the parties cannot read and write, transactions will become 
very inefficient, particularly when transactions are very complicated, as compared with 
the case where both parties can read and write. Reading, writing, and arithmetic are 
unquestionably the most fundamental types of education capital, and business among 
people who do not have these will be extremely inefficient in modern society. 
 This nature is important because if a worker newly acquires some type of 
education capital, that worker’s performance and that of counterparts who already possess 
the same education capital will potentially improve at the same time. That is, the benefits 
from acquiring education capital are distributed not only to the worker but also to the 
worker’s counterparts. They can enjoy benefits without any additional cost and effort 
because another worker additionally acquired the same education capital (i.e., 
externalities exist in education).  
 
4.2  The model 
4.2.1  The key mechanism 
If a worker coincidentally transacts business with another worker who possesses the same 
education capital, the transaction between them will be implemented more smoothly, 
efficiently, and productively. Note that although it is implemented more “productively,” 
this improvement is unrelated to labor productivity (ω), as indicated in the previous 
sections. 
 In the model in this paper, this improvement in efficiency or productivity is 
described as an increase in the value of education capital. That is, the value of the capital 
increases from its initial value by this improvement. It increases because a larger amount 
of production can potentially be generated using the same initial amount of education 
capital. When two workers who possess the same education capital coincidentally transact 
business with each other, an increase in the value of the education capital of the two 
workers is actually materialized. This is the key mechanism in the model of education 
externalities in this paper. 
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 This mechanism indicates that, if a worker newly acquires education capital, the 
value of education capital that is already possessed by other workers increases. These 
workers can enjoy this increased value without any additional cost and effort. 
Furthermore, these workers can enjoy benefits without paying any compensation to the 
worker who newly acquired the education capital.  
 
4.2.2  Environment 
Suppose that there are many workers and they are uniformly distributed over a unit line 
segment [0, 1], and therefore the quantity (number) of all workers is unity. Each worker 
transacts business with each of the other workers once in a unit period. All workers are 
identical except for education capital (i.e., there is no difference between an LI and an HI 
worker). Therefore, the production function used in this model is the one described by 
equation (6).  
 Workers can possess different types of education capital. Let δi be the ratio of 
workers who have acquired and possess type i education capital to all workers, and 0 < δi 
≤1. Because each worker transacts business with each of the other workers once in a unit 
period, the ratio of transactions between that worker and the other workers who possess 
the same type i education capital to those between the worker and all other workers 
(regardless of whether they possess type i education capital) is 𝛿𝑖2. The performances of 𝛿𝑖2 transactions are therefore improved by the mechanism explained in Section 4.2.1, 
whereas the performances of the other 1 − 𝛿𝑖2 transactions are not. 
 
4.2.3  Capital 
Capital is composed of usual capital and education capital. The value of usual capital is 
equal to the costs that are required to produce or obtain it. The “initial” value of education 
capital is also equal to the costs required to acquire it. The word “initial” here means 
before the mechanism of externalities has worked or when the effects of externalities are 
ignored or removed. The value of type i education capital is determined not only by the 
initial value but also by the effects of externalities (i.e., the value of δi). Hence, the value 
of type i education capital is a function of δi. The value of all capital (K) in the production 
function is the sum of the values of usual and education capital.  
 Suppose that there are M (> 1) types of education capital. Let KEDU, i be the total 
(summed over all workers) value of type i education capital possessed by workers in the 
economy. Taking the effect of δi on education capital shown in Section 4.2.1 into 
consideration, it is assumed for simplicity that, for any i,  
 𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 = ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 )  ,                                           (8) 
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where 𝜒(> 0) is a parameter and common for any i, and ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 is the initial value of 𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖  (i.e., it is 𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖  when the effect of 𝛿𝑖  on education capital is ignored or 
removed); therefore, ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖  indicates the total (or summed) costs that are needed to 
acquire type i education capital by workers in the economy. Parameter χ represents the 
strength of effect of δi, and as the value of χ decreases, the strength increases. The total 
value of education capital in the economy (𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈) is therefore 
  𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈 =∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1  . 
 
Hence, capital in the economy is  
  𝐾 = 𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 + 𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 )]  ,𝑀𝑖=1  
 
where 𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 is the total value of usual capital in the economy. 
 
4.2.4  The production function 
By equation (6), the production function is described as  
 
𝑌 = 𝜎?̅?𝐿𝛼 {𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1 }
1−𝛼
 .                         (9) 
 
4.3  Externalities 
4.3.1  Effects of 𝜹𝒊 on Y 
Equation (8) indicates that education has the nature of externalities, and in addition, the 
degree of externality increases as the value of δi increases.  
 If the effects of 𝛿𝑖 are ignored or removed and the value of 𝛿𝑖 is set to be zero 
for any i, the education capital values are equal to their initial values, and the production 
function described by equation (9) degenerates to   
 
𝑌𝛿=0 = 𝜎?̅?𝐿𝛼 {𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝑀𝑖=1 }
1−𝛼
 ,                                (10) 
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where 𝑌𝛿=0 is Y in this case. By equations (9) and (10), 
 𝑌𝑌𝛿=0 = {𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 + ∑ [?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖
2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 + ∑ ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝑀𝑖=1 }
1−𝛼 > 0                         (11) 
 
because 0 < δi ≤1 and 0 < 𝜒. Inequality (11) indicates that production increases because 
of the effect of 𝛿𝑖 (i.e., by education externalities).  
 On the other hand,  
   𝑑𝑌𝑑𝛿𝑖 =  ?̅??̅?𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝛼) {𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (𝜒 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1 }−𝛼 {𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝑑𝛿𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 ) + ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 2𝛿𝑖𝜒 }  .   (12) 
 
Because an increase in ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 indicates that the number of workers who acquire and 
possess type i education capital increases and thereby 𝛿𝑖 increases, then  
 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 > 0  .                                                   (13) 
 
Hence, by equation (12) and inequality (13), 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝛿𝑖 > 0 .                                                        (14) 
 
 Inequalities (11) and (14) again indicate that the production function shows the 
existence of education externalities.  
 
4.3.2  Increasing returns to scale 
By equation (9), for some parameter 𝛾(> 1), 
 
𝑌𝛾 = 𝜎?̅?(𝛾𝐿)𝛼 {𝛾𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[𝛾?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖,𝛾2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1 }
1−𝛼
 ,                 (15) 
 
where 𝑌𝛾  and 𝛿𝑖,𝛾  are Y and 𝛿𝑖  after ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖  increased to 𝛾?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 , respectively. 
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Because  
 𝛿𝑖,𝛾2 > 𝛿𝑖2 
 
by inequality (13) and 𝛾 > 1, then by equations (9) and (15),  
 
 𝑌𝛾𝑌 = 𝛾 {  
  𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 + ∑ [?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖,𝛾2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 + ∑ [?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 (1 + 𝛿𝑖2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑖=1 }  
  1−𝛼 > 𝛾 . 
 
That is, the production function shows increasing returns to scale, which is another aspect 
of education externalities.  
 In addition, by equation (9),  
   𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 = 
?̅??̅?𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝛼){𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑗 (1 + 𝛿𝑗2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑗=1 }
−𝛼
[   
 1 + 𝛿𝑖2 + ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝜒 ]   
 
 .      (16) 
 
On the other hand,  
 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 = 𝜎?̅?𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝛼){𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑗 (1 + 𝛿𝑗2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑗=1 }
−𝛼
 .             (17) 
 
Hence, by equations (16) and (17) and inequality (13), 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 = 1 +
𝛿𝑖2 + ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝜒 > 1 .                             (18) 
 
That is, the return on investments in education capital is larger than that on usual capital. 
The extra return on investments in education is  
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𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 − 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 > 0 .                                             (19) 
 
 Inequalities (18) and (19) imply that investments in education capital increase 
more rapidly and eventually become far larger than those of usual capital because of the 
higher returns. However, there is a mechanism that acts to dampen investments in 
education capital. This mechanism is discussed in Section 4.5. 
 
4.3.3  Distribution of increased incomes  
If the value of type i education capital increases because a worker newly acquired it, the 
total production and income in the economy increase because the increase in the value of 
type i education capital indicates that the total capital inputs for production in the 
economy increase.  
 To whom is this increase in incomes distributed? Can only the worker who newly 
acquired type i education capital obtain all the increase in incomes? Because of the 
existence of externalities, the increase in incomes is distributed equally to all workers 
who possess type i education capital, not only to the worker who newly acquired it.  
 
4.4  Tree diagram of education capital 
Basically, knowledge and technology increase incrementally and additively. New 
knowledge and technologies are added to the foundation of previous knowledge and 
technologies. Of course, great leaps in knowledge and technologies may have 
occasionally occurred (i.e., new discoveries), but they could not be discovered without 
the foundation of accumulated past knowledge and technologies. 
 Therefore, various pieces of knowledge and technologies can be described by a 
tree diagram. Because education capital depends crucially on accumulated knowledge, 
various types of education capital can be also described by a tree diagram. A tree has the 
base, branches, and many twigs, which means that a tree consists of many parts with 
different features. Similarly, knowledge and education capital are composed of many 
elements that have different features. 
 The base of a knowledge tree is the knowledge that is the foundation of all the 
other pieces of knowledge. On the other hand, each knowledge twig deals with very 
limited pieces of knowledge. Branches that are located closer to the base will correspond 
to more elementary pieces of knowledge, and those located farther from the base will 
correspond to more specialized and sophisticated pieces of knowledge.  
 In this analogy, the base of the education capital tree corresponds to reading, 
writing, and arithmetic, which are usually taught at elementary schools, whereas the twigs 
correspond to the educational content studied mostly at universities and graduate schools. 
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It seems highly likely that, if type i education capital is an elementary piece of education, 
the value of 𝛿𝑖  is large (e.g., almost unity), but on the other hand, if it is a very 
specialized piece of knowledge, the value of 𝛿𝑖 is very small (e.g., almost zero). 
 
4.5  Limit of education externalities  
Because education capital has the tree-like structure described above, the value of δi for 
most types of education capital is highly likely to have an upper bound that is far lower 
than unity because of specialization. Specialization means that most other workers need 
not acquire the education capital that a small number of specialists already possess.  
 
4.5.1  Division of labor  
Workers are specialized as much as possible within an economy; that is, there is a division 
of labor. The number of specialists for each specialized skill is constrained by the 
structure of the division of labor within the economy, and the number of specialists for 
each specialized skill is very small compared with the number of all workers. Given this 
division of labor, the demands of firms (or employers) for workers who are specialists 
(i.e., those who possess twigs of education capital) have an upper bound.  
 Even if the wage of specialists with regard to a particular type of education 
capital decreases significantly, specialists of this type will never be demanded and hired 
by firms beyond its upper bound because the upper bound is determined by the structure 
of division of labor in the economy, not by wages. That is, the demand for a worker for a 
particular specialized type of education capital will be very inelastic and its demand curve 
will be almost vertical. These specialists are recruited by firms up to the upper bound, but 
no more are demanded past that point.  
 
4.5.2  The upper bound of δi  
Even if inequality (18) always holds (i.e., if the return on investments in education capital 
is always higher than that in usual capital), the number of workers who possess type i 
education capital does not exceed a certain critical number.  
 Let 𝛿?̅? be the upper bound of type i education capital, and 𝛿𝑖 ≤ 𝛿?̅? ≤ 1 for any 
i. Because of inequality (18), any type of education capital will be accumulated until 𝛿𝑖 
reaches 𝛿?̅?. The existence of the upper bound of δi means that the effect of education 
externalities has a limit. 
 Note, however, that knowledge itself will increase indefinitely, and the degree 
of division of labor (i.e., specialization) will also increase. That is, increases in knowledge 
are almost canceled out by increases in the degree of specialization; therefore,  
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∑𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 < 1 
 
will be kept in an economy. Of course, there may be workers who are specialists in 
multiple fields and possess diplomas in different fields, but specialists usually operate in 
a single field.  
 
4.5.3  Education externalities and equilibrium investments 
If 𝛿𝑖 reaches its upper bound for any i (i.e., if 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅?), investments in education capital 
stop being made. After that, investments are made only in usual capital; therefore, through 
arbitrage in markets, 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 = 𝑟 = 𝜃                                                    (20) 
 
is always kept. Because 𝑟 = 𝜃 is kept, equation (20) is consistent with equation (7). 
Because equation (20) is consistent with education externalities in the sense that equation 
(20) and education externalities coexist without any problems, education externalities are 
also consistent with equation (7). Hence, by equation (20) and inequality (18), 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 = 𝑟 = 𝜃 < 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖  
 
is kept consistently with education externalities and equation (7). 
 In actuality, of course, investments in education capital never stop being made 
because some workers retire and their replacements are needed in every period. For 
simplicity, I ignore this replacement in this paper. 
 
4.6  Other possible sources of externalities in education 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, possibility (3) also exists as an effect of education. As 
Harashima (2009) showed, 𝜎  is a worker’s accessibility limit to capital and is 
determined not only by the availability of physical transportation facilities but also by 
efficiencies of law enforcement, regulations, the financial system, and other related 
factors. It seems likely that, if the average education level in a country increases, these 
efficiencies will improve and thereby the value of 𝜎  will increase. The production 
function described by equation (5) indicates that an increase in 𝜎 increases production 
using the same amounts of inputs and benefits everyone. Therefore, if an increase in 𝜎 
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is generated by education, education benefits everyone (i.e., it has externalities through 
the effect on 𝜎).  
 In addition, Harashima (2020b) showed that many people are often intentionally 
misled by other parties when making decisions in dealings in business, and as a result, 
they unconsciously give away economic rents to the other parties. It seems likely that the 
probability of a person being misled by other people decreases if the person is more 
educated. A decrease in this probability may also increase the value of 𝜎 because it may 
cause the number of attempts to mislead people to decrease because of the lower level of 
success in doing so. Education therefore may also have externalities through this channel. 
 
5  SUBSIDIZED OR COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
 
5.1  Elementary schools 
It is highly likely that if the knowledge corresponding to education capital i is closer to 
the base of the knowledge tree, the value of 𝛿?̅? is higher. As indicated in Section 4.4, the 
materials taught at elementary schools (i.e., reading, writing, and arithmetic) correspond 
to the base of the knowledge tree. Hence, the value of 𝛿?̅? of education capital acquired 
in elementary schools will be near unity, and almost all employers will require their 
employees to possess this type of education capital.  
 Note that the costs to attend elementary schools are almost always paid by 
parents (through taxes in many cases), not the children. However, in this paper, it is 
assumed for simplicity that these costs are paid by the children themselves (i.e., the future 
workers) on the assumption that the costs are paid by them later when they become adults. 
Hence, in this paper, it is “workers” who study at elementary schools and at the same time 
pay their costs. 
 
5.1.1  Costs for education externalities 
Suppose for simplicity that the cost of acquiring education capital is covered only by 
loans. Let the payment of loans for the cost of acquiring a unit of type i education capital 
(?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖) in each period be ci. Suppose also that the value of ci is common for all types of 
education capital (i.e., 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐(̅> 0)) for any i. Through arbitrage in markets, 𝑐𝑖 is kept 
equal to the real interest rate such that 
 𝑐̅ = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 = 𝑟 .                                                  (21) 
 
5.1.2  Benefits from education externalities 
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By equation (16), if 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 = 
𝜎?̅?𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝛼){𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑗 (1 + 𝛿𝑗2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑗=1 }
−𝛼
( 
 1 + 𝛿𝑖2 + ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝜒 ) 
 > 𝑐̅ ; 
 
therefore, by equations (17) and (20), if 
 
𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈( 




 1 + 𝛿𝑖2 + 𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝜒 ) 
 > 𝑐̅ ,                             (22) 
 
workers will continue to acquire type i education capital up to the point 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅?. Because 𝑐̅ = 𝑟 as indicated by equation (21), by inequality (22), if  
 𝛿𝑖2 + ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝜒 > 0 ,                                          (23) 
 
type i education capital will continue to be acquired up to the point 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅?. By inequality 
(13), δi > 0, ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 > 0, and 𝜒 > 0, inequality (23) is always held; therefore, 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅? 
will be always eventually be achieved and maintained. 
 Let  
 𝑇𝐵𝑖 = ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 ( 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 − 𝑐̅) 
 
for 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅?. 𝑇𝐵𝑖 indicates the total (or summed) benefits generated by the externality of 
type i education capital (i.e., the extra increases in production incurred due to the 
externalities) within the economy. By equations (21) and (22),  
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 𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 ( 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 − 𝑐̅) = 𝑟?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝛿𝑖2 + ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖
𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖𝜒  . 
 
 Here, suppose for simplicity that  
 
 ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 , 
 
where ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 is a constant and common for any i. Hence, because  
 ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑(𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈) = 2𝛿𝑖2 ,                            (24) 
 
then 
 𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 𝑟𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈𝜒 [𝛿𝑖2 + 𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 𝑑𝛿𝑖2𝑑(𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈)] = 3𝑟𝛿𝑖3𝜒 ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 .                 (25) 
 
5.1.3  Benefits from externalities of education when 𝜹𝒊 = 𝟏 
Consider the case where 𝛿?̅? = 1. Let i in this case be E; therefore, 𝛿?̅? = 1. Type E 
education capital is, for example, education that is taught in elementary schools. Because 𝛿?̅? = 1, any worker can acquire type E education capital if they want. By equations (16) 
and (24), 
 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝜎?̅?𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝛼) {𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑗 (1 + 𝛿𝑗2𝜒)]𝑀𝑗=1 }
−𝛼 (1 + 3𝛿𝐸3𝜒 )  . 
 
If 𝛿𝐸 = 𝛿?̅? = 1,  
 
 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝜎?̅?𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝛼){𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 +∑[?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝑗 (1 + 𝛿𝑗2𝜒 )]𝑀𝑗=1 }
−𝛼 (1 + 3𝜒)  , 
 
and by equations (17) and (20), 
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 𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐾𝑈𝑆𝑈 (1 + 3𝜒)       = 𝑟 (1 + 3𝜒)  .  
 
Hence, the benefits (
𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸) at 𝛿𝐸 = 𝛿?̅? = 1 exceed the costs (𝑐̅). That is, if  
  𝑑𝑌𝑑?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝑟 (1 + 3𝜒) > 𝑐̅ , 
 
and therefore, because 𝑟 = 𝑐̅, if 
 3𝜒 > 0 ,                                                         (26) 
 
then type E education capital will be demanded and acquired by all workers. Because 𝜒 > 0 and thereby inequality (26) is always satisfied, all workers will eventually acquire 
type E education capital; that is, the state 𝛿𝐸 = 𝛿?̅? = 1 will be naturally realized.  
 In addition, by equation (25), 
  𝑇𝐵𝐸 = 3𝑟𝜒 ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 ,                                                 (27) 
 
and  
 𝑇𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 3𝑟𝜒 ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈3𝑟𝛿𝑖3𝜒 ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 1𝛿𝑖3 
 
for any i with 𝛿𝑖 < 1; therefore,  
  𝑇𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐵𝑖 > 1 . 
 
Particularly, if the value of 𝛿𝑖 is far smaller than unity, the difference between 𝑇𝐵𝐸 and 𝑇𝐵𝑖 will be very large because of the factor of 𝛿𝑖 in 𝑇𝐵𝑖.  
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5.1.4  Benefits from externalities of education when 𝜹𝒊 < 𝟏 
5.1.4.1  Decrease in benefits 
As shown in Section 5.1.3, the state 𝛿𝐸 = 𝛿?̅? = 1  will be naturally realized, which 
means, in theory, that all workers will attend elementary schools. However, some workers 
may not enter elementary schools because of poverty, borrowing constraints, or other 
reasons. Particularly, poverty with borrowing constraints may prevent some workers from 
attending school. 
 Suppose that type E education capital is that taught at elementary school in a 
country and 𝛿?̅? = 1, but elementary schools in the country are not compulsory. Therefore, 1 − 𝜂𝐸(0 < 1 − 𝜂𝐸 < 𝛿?̅? = 1) of the workers do not attend elementary schools because 
of poverty with borrowing constraints. That is, 𝜂𝐸  workers acquire type E education 
capital, but 1 − 𝜂𝐸 of them do not.  
 Let 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸  be 𝑇𝐵𝐸 in this case. Therefore, by equations (25) and (27),   
  𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 = ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟𝜒 𝜂𝐸3  . 
 
Hence,  
  𝑇𝐵𝐸 − 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 = 3𝑟𝜒 ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 − 3𝑟𝜂𝐸3𝜒 ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈(1 − 𝜂𝐸3) 3𝑟𝜒  , 
 
and because 𝜂𝐸 < 1, 
  𝑇𝐵𝐸 − 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 > 0 . 
 
That is, 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸  is smaller than 𝑇𝐵𝐸. 
 In this case, the benefits per unit of education capital (units of 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 for a unit 
of ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝜂𝐸?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈) enjoyed by each of the 𝜂𝐸  workers are  
 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 𝜂𝐸?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟𝜒 𝜂𝐸3𝜂𝐸?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 3𝑟𝜒 𝜂𝐸2  .                             (28) 
 
For comparison, consider the case where 𝜂𝐸 = 1. In this case, the benefits per unit of 
education capital enjoyed by each of the 𝜂𝐸  workers are 
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𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 ?̃?𝐸𝐷𝑈,𝐸 = 𝑇𝐵𝜂,𝐸 𝜂𝐸?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 𝑇𝐵𝐸?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 3𝑟𝜒  .                                    (29) 
 
Equations (28) and (29) indicate that because of the existence of the 1 − 𝜂𝐸 workers, the 
benefits per unit of education capital enjoyed by each of the 𝜂𝐸  workers are reduced by 
 𝑅𝑑1 = 3𝑟𝜒 (1 − 𝜂𝐸2) .                                               (30) 
 
That is, the 𝜂𝐸  workers who attend elementary schools cannot fully enjoy the benefits 
of externalities by 𝑅𝑑1 because of the existence of the 1 − 𝜂𝐸  workers who do not 
attend them.  
 
5.1.4.2  Condition for compulsory elementary education 
To fully enjoy the benefits of externalities, the 𝜂𝐸  workers may choose to pay the 
schooling costs of the 1 − 𝜂𝐸 workers and make them attend elementary schools, e.g., 
compulsorily. As shown in Section 5.1.1 and by equation (21), the cost per unit of 
education capital (𝑐̅ = 𝑟) is constant regardless of 𝜂𝐸 . Therefore, the burden for each 𝜂𝐸  
worker to pay the costs for the 1 − 𝜂𝐸  workers, each of whom acquires a unit of 
education capital, is  
 𝐴𝑐1 = 𝑐̅(1 − 𝜂𝐸)𝜂𝐸 =𝑟(1 − 𝜂𝐸)𝜂𝐸  .                                      (31) 
 
Equation (31) means that the total (summed) costs for the 1 − 𝜂𝐸 workers are shared 
equally by all of the 𝜂𝐸  workers. 
 If the benefits per unit of education capital enjoyed by each 𝜂𝐸  worker exceed 
the burdens for each 𝜂𝐸  worker to pay the costs of the 1 − 𝜂𝐸 workers (i.e., if Rd1 > 
Ac1), the 𝜂𝐸  workers may choose to support the 1 − 𝜂𝐸  workers by making them 
compulsorily attend elementary schools at the expense of the 𝜂𝐸  workers. That is, by 
equations (30) and (31), if 
  𝑟 3𝜒 (1 − 𝜂𝐸2) > 𝑐̅(1 − 𝜂𝐸)𝜂𝐸  , 
 
and therefore, if  
 𝜂𝐸2 + 𝜂𝐸 − 𝜒3 > 0 ,                                                 (32) 
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then it may be better for them to pay the expense. Here, if 
 
1 ≥ 𝜂𝐸  >√9 + 12 χ6 − 12  ,                                           (33) 
 
inequality (32) is satisfied. For example, when 𝜂𝐸  = 0.5, if 
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12 ≥ 𝜒 > 0 ,                                                     (34) 
 
inequality (32) is always satisfied. 
χ is a parameter in equation (8) that represents the strength of the education 
externality. As the value of χ decreases, the strength of the externality increases. 
Therefore, inequalities (33) and (34) indicate that, if the strength of externality is 
sufficiently strong, the probability that the 𝜂𝐸  workers choose to support the 1 − 𝜂𝐸  
workers and as a result elementary schools become compulsory is high. 
 
5.1.4.3  Necessity of other reasons for compulsory elementary education 
Inequality (33) indicates that, if  
  1 − 𝜂𝐸 ≥ 32−√9 + 12 𝜒6  , 
 
then inequality (32) is not satisfied. That is, if a sufficiently large number of workers 
initially do not attend elementary schools, the cost of compulsory education for the 𝜂𝐸  
workers exceeds their benefits. As a result, 𝜂𝐸  workers may reject the idea of 
compulsory elementary school.  
 In this case, another rationale for compulsory elementary school attendance is 
required. For example, a government may force its people to attend elementary schools 
to strengthen national security.  
 
5.1.5  Private or public schools? 
The costs of compulsory education are usually paid by taxpayers. This means that these 
costs are most often paid by high-income workers because of progressive income taxes. 
However, in many countries, public and private schools exist. Moreover, high-income 
workers more often attend private schools. These high-income workers therefore pay 
double costs—they pay the costs for public schools through taxes and they pay for tuition 
at private schools. Why do they choose to attend private schools? 
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 One possibility is that schools provide not only education capital but also other 
items or experiences of value (e.g., friends, connections, tradition, status, and security), 
and different things are provided in different schools. Another possibility is that teachers’ 
skills vary across schools. If a private school provides something of more value as 
compared with public schools or if its teachers’ skills are higher than those of public 
school teachers, some workers may choose private schools.  
 Generally, students in public elementary schools are not selected by the schools 
but are mechanically allocated by some pre-existing set of rules. Therefore, workers 
(children) with various backgrounds study at the same public school. On the other hand, 
private schools can select students, and these students may be far more homogeneous. 
Education in a homogeneous environment for selected students may provide additional 
benefits to the students.  
 
5.2  Universities 
As indicated in Section 4.4, the contents of education at universities and graduate schools 
correspond to the twigs of the knowledge tree. Therefore, the value of 𝛿?̅? of the education 
capital acquired at universities and graduate schools will be very small. Equation (25) 
indicates that, if the value of 𝛿?̅? is very small, 𝑇𝐵𝑖 is also very small.  
 It is assumed that the costs to acquire education capital at universities and 
graduate schools are 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐(̅> 0) for any i, and that equation (21) always holds. 
 
5.2.1  Benefits from externalities of education in the case of a small ?̅?𝒊  
Suppose that N among M types of education capital correspond to education at 
universities (0 < N < M), and in addition, types 1, 2, 3, … , N of education capital are 
types of education capital that correspond to education only obtained at universities 
(“university education capital”). It is also assumed for simplicity that each worker 
acquires only one type of university education capital. Hence,  
  ∑𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑗=1 < 1 . 
 
 Let 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅? be 𝑇𝐵𝑖 when 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅?. Hence, by equation (25), 





 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅?𝑇𝐵𝑖 = ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟𝛿?̅?




For any 𝛿𝑖 < 𝛿?̅?(≤ 1), therefore,  
  𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅?𝑇𝐵𝑖 > 1 . 
 
 By equations (25) and (35), 
  𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅? − 𝑇𝐵𝑖 = ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟𝛿?̅?3𝜒 − ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟𝛿𝑖3𝜒 = ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑖3)𝜒 > 0 , 
 
and thereby,  
  𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅? − ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑖3)𝜒  . 
 
Hence, the benefits per unit of education capital enjoyed by each of the 𝛿𝑖 workers are  
 𝑇𝐵𝑖 𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅? − ?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 3𝑟(𝛿?̅?
3 − 𝛿𝑖3)𝜒𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈  = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅?𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 − 3𝑟(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑖3)𝛿𝑖𝜒  .                                     (36) 
 
On the other hand, if 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿?̅?, 
 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅?𝛿𝑖?̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,?̅?𝛿?̅??̅?𝐸𝐷𝑈   .                                               (37) 
 
Equations (36) and (37) indicate that, because of the existence of the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers 
who do not acquire university education capital, the benefits per unit of education capital 
enjoyed by each of the 𝛿𝑖 workers is reduced by 
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𝑅𝑑2 = 3𝑟(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑖3)𝛿𝑖𝜒  .                                             (38) 
 
5.2.2  𝜹𝒊 workers support ?̅?𝒊 − 𝜹𝒊 workers  
If some workers cannot pay the costs and enter universities for some reason, particularly 
because of poverty with borrowing constraints, and thereby 𝛿?̅? = 𝛿𝑖 cannot be achieved, 
how should the 𝛿𝑖 workers respond? If the benefits gained by achieving 𝛿?̅? = 𝛿𝑖 are 
larger than the cost to achieve it by paying the costs for the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖  workers, the 𝛿𝑖 
workers may choose to pay the costs, even if they have to pay the costs for both 
themselves and the other workers. 
 If the 𝛿𝑖 workers pay the costs for the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers, the burden for each 𝛿𝑖 
worker is  
 𝐴𝑐2 = 𝑐̅(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖)𝛿𝑖  .                                                (39) 
 
Equation (39) means that the total (summed) costs for the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖  workers (i.e., 𝑐̅(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖)) are shared equally by all of the 𝛿𝑖 workers. Therefore, if Rd2 > Ac2, the 𝛿𝑖 
workers may choose to pay the costs for the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers. That is, by equations (38) 
and (39), if  
  3𝑟(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑖3)𝛿𝑖𝜒 > 𝑐̅ 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖𝛿𝑖  , 
 
and thereby if 
 3(𝛿?̅?2 + 𝛿?̅?𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖2) > 𝜒  ,                                           (40) 
 
then the 𝛿𝑖 workers may choose this option. 
 Inequality (40) indicates that as the value of 𝛿𝑖  increases (i.e., as a larger 
number of workers already have acquired type i education capital), the probability that 
the 𝛿𝑖  workers support the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖  workers increases. In addition, as the value of χ 
decreases (i.e., the strength of externality is stronger), the probability increases. 
 
5.2.3  All 𝜹𝒊 workers support all ?̅?𝒊 − 𝜹𝒊 workers 
Next, consider the case that all 𝛿𝑖  workers (i.e., the sum of all 𝛿𝑖  workers for all 𝑖(≤ 𝑁)) in a country collectively pay the costs for all 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers (i.e., the sum of 
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the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers for all 𝑖(≤ 𝑁)) in the country.  
 In this case, by equation (38), because of the existence of 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers, the 
benefits per unit of education capital enjoyed by each 𝛿𝑖 worker are reduced on average 
by  
 
 𝑅𝑑3 = ∑ [(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑗3) 3𝑟𝛿𝑗𝜒]𝑁𝑗=1 𝑁  .                                       (41) 
 
The term “on average” is added because the values of 𝛿𝑖 and 𝛿?̅? vary among the types 
of education capital. In addition, the per capita burdens for all 𝛿𝑖 workers are  
 𝐴𝑐3 = 𝑐̅ ∑ (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑗=1  .                                            (42) 
 
Equation (42) means that the total (summed) costs for all 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖  workers (i.e., 𝑐̅ ∑ (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖))𝑁𝑗=1  are shared equally by all 𝛿𝑖 workers (i.e., ∑ 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 . Therefore, if Rd3 
> Ac3, many 𝛿𝑖 workers may choose to support all of the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers; that is, by 
equations (41) and (42), if  
 
 ∑ [(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑗3) 3𝛿𝑗𝜒]𝑁𝑗=1 𝑁 − ∑ (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑗=1 > 0 , 
 
then the 𝛿𝑖 workers may make this choice. 
 Here, suppose for simplicity that 𝛿𝑖 = 𝜓𝛿?̅? and 𝛿?̅? = 𝛿̅ for any 𝑖(≤ 𝑁) where 𝛿̅ and 𝜓 are constants, and 0 < 𝜓 < 1 and 1 > 𝛿̅ > 0. That is, the value of 𝛿𝑖  is 
identical for any type 𝑖(≤ 𝑁). Hence, if  
 3(1 + 𝜓 + 𝜓2)𝛿̅2 > 𝜒 ,                                             (43) 
 
then many 𝛿𝑖 workers may choose to support all of the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers. 
 Inequality (43) indicates that if 𝜓 is sufficiently high (i.e., if enough workers 
have already acquired university education capital), the probability that all of the 𝛿𝑖 
workers will support all of the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers may be high. In addition, equality (43) 
also indicates that, as the value of 𝛿̅ increases and as the value of 𝜒 decreases (i.e., the 
strength of the externality increases), this probability increases.  
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5.2.4  Only high-income workers are burdened 
If university education is subsidized by the government, the subsidies are paid by 
taxpayers, particularly by high-income workers because of progressive income taxes. I 
now examine the case where only high-income workers pay the costs for all 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 
workers. It is assumed for simplicity that  
  ∑𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 = 1 ; 
 
that is, any worker can acquire any type of university education capital, but they may only 
acquire one type. Therefore, ∑ 𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 = 1 means that the quantity of all workers in the 
country is unity, and they are uniformly distributed over a unit line segment [0, 1]. 
 Let 𝜌(0 < 𝜌 < 1) be the ratio of high-income workers to all workers in a 
country. Because the quantity of all workers is unity (i.e., ∑ 𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 = 1), 𝜌 indicates not 
only the ratio but the quantity of high-income workers. In this case, by equation (42), the 
per capita burden for the 𝜌 high-income workers is  
 𝐴𝑐5 = 𝑐̅ ∑ (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1𝜌∑ 𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 =𝑐̅ ∑ (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 𝜌                               (44) 
 
because ∑ 𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 = 1 indicates the quantity of all workers. Hence, if Rd3 > Ac5, most 
high-income workers may choose to support all 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers; that is, by equations 
(41) and (44), if  
 ∑ [(𝛿?̅?3 − 𝛿𝑗3) 3𝛿𝑗𝜒]𝑁𝑗=1 𝑁 − ∑ (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 𝜌 > 0 ,                            (45) 
 
and thereby, if 
 𝜌3(1 + 𝜓 + 𝜓2)𝛿̅2 > 𝜒 ,                                              (46) 
 
then most high-income workers may make that choice. Inequalities (43) and (46) indicate 
that the hurdle to support all 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers is higher in this case than it is in the case 
that all 𝛿𝑖 workers support 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers because 0 < 𝜌 < 1. 
 In this case, although all low-income 𝛿𝑖 workers can receive support from the 
high-income (𝜌) workers, some 𝜌 workers who belong to the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers also can 
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receive the support from other 𝜌 workers, even if they are high-income workers. In this 
sense, some people may feel a sense of injustice or unfairness. Therefore, inequality (46) 
will not be the only determining factor as to whether this kind of scheme is accepted by 
people in a country.  
 
5.2.5  Only low-income ?̅?𝒊 − 𝜹𝒊  workers are supported by high-
income workers 
A more realistic scheme will be one in which only high-income (𝜌) workers are burdened 
and only low-income 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖  workers are supported. Scholarships for low-income 
workers are one possible type of support scheme. In this case, however, the motivation 
for 𝜌 workers to accept this scheme may not be its economic benefits; rather, it may be 
because of their generosity or spirit of social service. 
 Suppose for simplicity that 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) in 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖  workers are low-income 
workers (the 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers) where 0 < 𝜏𝑖 < 1. In addition, let  
  𝛿𝜏,𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) + 𝛿𝑖 ; 
 
thereby, 
  𝛿𝜏,𝑖 < 𝛿?̅? ,                                                       (47) 
 
and 
  𝛿𝜏,𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑖)𝛿𝑖 > 𝛿𝑖 . 
 𝛿𝜏,𝑖 is the 𝛿𝑖 increased by the support from 𝜌 workers. As inequality (47) indicates, 𝛿𝜏,𝑖 never increases up to 𝛿?̅?. 
 In this case, per capita burdens for the ρ high-income workers are  
 𝐴𝑐6 =  𝑐̅ ∑ 𝜏𝑗(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1𝜌∑ 𝛿?̅?𝑁𝑗=1 =𝑐̅ ∑ 𝜏𝑗(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 𝜌  .                        (48) 
 
On the other hand, benefits per unit of education capital enjoyed by each 𝛿𝑖 worker are 
reduced owing to the existence of the 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers (or equivalently, they are 
increased if they support all 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers) not by 𝑅𝑑3 but by 
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𝑅𝑑4 = 𝑅𝑑3 − ∑ 〈{𝛿?̅?3 − [𝜏𝑗𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝛿𝑗]3} 3𝑟𝛿𝑗𝜒〉𝑁𝑗=1 𝑁  = {∑[𝜏𝑗𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝛿𝑗]3𝛿𝑗 −∑𝛿𝑗2𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑗=1 } 3𝑟𝑁𝜒  .                             (49) 
 
In equation (49), the term  
 ∑ 〈{𝛿?̅?3 − [𝜏𝑗𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝛿𝑗]3} 3𝑟𝛿𝑗𝜒〉𝑁𝑗=1 𝑁  
 
is the reduced benefits owing to the existence of the 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝜏,𝑖 workers. Because 
 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏𝑖)(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) + 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) = 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝜏,𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) ,                                                       
 
and thereby, 
  𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) = (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) − (𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝜏,𝑖) , 
 𝑅𝑑4 indicates only a part of the reduced benefits resulting from all 𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖 workers, that 
is, the part resulting from 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers. 
 If Rd4 > Ac6, 𝜌 workers may choose to support 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers. That is, 
by equations (48) and (49), if  
 
{∑[𝜏𝑗𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝛿𝑗]3𝛿𝑗 −∑𝛿𝑗2𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑗=1 } 3𝑟𝑁𝜒 − 𝑐̅ ∑ 𝜏𝑗(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 𝜌 > 0 ,           (50) 
 
then they may make that choice. Suppose for simplicity that 𝜏𝑖 = 𝜏̅ for any 𝑖(≤ 𝑁), 
where 𝜏̅ is a constant and 0 < 𝜏̅ < 1. Hence, by inequality (50), if  
 
 {∑[𝜏̅𝛿̅ + (1 − 𝜏̅)𝜓𝛿̅]3𝜓𝛿̅ −∑𝜓2𝛿̅2𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑗=1 } 3𝑁𝜒 − ∑ 𝜏̅(𝛿̅ − 𝜓𝛿̅)𝑁𝑗=1𝜌∑ 𝜓𝛿̅𝑁𝑗=1 > 0 , 
 
and thereby if   
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 3𝜌 [𝜏̅𝛿̅ + (1 − 𝜏̅)𝜓𝛿̅]3 − 𝜓3𝛿̅3𝜏̅(1 − 𝜓)𝛿̅ > 𝜒 ,                                     (51) 
 
they may choose to support the 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers. In any case, however, a comparison 
between inequalities (45) and (50) or (51) indicates that it is unclear whether the hurdle 
in this case is lower than that of the case in Section 5.2.5. 
 However, in this case, even if  
 
 {∑[𝜏𝑗𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝛿𝑗]3𝛿𝑗 −∑𝛿𝑗3𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑗=1 } 3𝑁𝜒 − ∑ 𝜏𝑗(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 𝜌  < 0 , 
 
or if  
  3𝜌 [𝜏̅𝛿̅ + (1 − 𝜏̅)𝜓𝛿̅]3 − 𝜓3𝛿̅3𝜏̅(1 − 𝜓)𝛿̅ < 𝜒 , 
 𝜌 workers may choose to support the 𝜏𝑖(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑖) workers as long as  
 
𝑆 + {∑[𝜏𝑗𝛿?̅? + (1 − 𝜏𝑗)𝛿𝑗]3𝛿𝑗 −∑𝛿𝑗3𝛿𝑗𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑗=1 } 3𝑁𝜒 − ∑ 𝜏𝑗(𝛿?̅? − 𝛿𝑗)𝑁𝑗=1 𝜌 > 0 
 
is satisfied for S > 0. S represents the degree of generosity or intention to improve social 
equity and may represent, for example, donations from high-income people. Clearly, as S 




The reason why education shows positive externalities is usually explained based on the 
concept of human capital. However, this concept is very elastic, and it is still unclear how 
human capital generates externalities. More broadly, the mechanism behind education 
externalities has not necessarily been sufficiently explained theoretically. 
 In this paper, I examined the mechanism of education externalities from a 
different point of view by introducing the concept of education capital based on an 
alternative production function presented by Harashima (2009, 2017) and the 
assumptions behind this production function. Education capital and human capital are 
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different in that education capital works in the same manner as the other kinds of capital 
(e.g., physical capital), but human capital does not. In addition, although it is generally 
thought that human capital can increase constantly and indefinitely and the effects of 
externalities can increase infinitely, the effects of externalities generated by education 
capital have an upper bound. Therefore, although human capital can be a driving force of 
indefinite endogenous growth, education capital cannot.  
 I showed that education does not improve labor productivities. Rather, it 
accumulates what I call education capital. Education capital has the unique nature that, if 
workers who possess the same type of education capital transact business with each other, 
their performances equally increase. Based on this nature, I constructed a model of 
externalities in education capital and showed how education externalities are generated 
by education capital. Because of the division of labor, education capital cannot be 
accumulated infinitely (i.e., the effects of have an upper bound). Hence, education capital 
cannot be a driving force of indefinite endogenous economic growth.  
 The uncovered mechanism of education externalities in this paper can provide 
many valuable insights for educational institutions and policies. I showed that elementary 
schools should basically be compulsory, as it is in many countries. Whether education 
(not research) in universities should be subsidized by governments, however, will vary 
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